Who is a Migrant? Abandoning the Nation-state Point of View in the Study of Migration

Stephan Scheel1* and Martina Tazzioli2

1 University of Duisburg-Essen
2 Goldsmiths, University of London

*Corresponding Author: stephan.scheel@uni-due.de

Abstract

This article develops an alternative definition of a migrant that embraces the perspective of mobility. Starting from the observation that the term ‘migrant’ has become a stigmatizing label that problematizes the mobility or the residency of people designated as such, we investigate the implications of nation-state centered conceptions of migration which define migration as movement from nation-state A to nation-state B. By asking ‘Who is a migrant in Europe today?’ we show that nation-state centered understandings of migration rest on a deeply entrenched methodological nationalism and implicate three epistemological traps that continue to shape much of the research on migration: first, the naturalization of the international nation-state order that results, secondly, in the ontologisation of ‘migrants’ as ready-available objects of research, while facilitating, thirdly, the framing of migration as problem of government. To overcome these epistemological traps, we develop an alternative conception of migration that, inspired by the autonomy of migration approach, adopts the perspective of mobility while highlighting the constitutive role that nation-states’ bordering practices play in the enactment of some people as migrants. Importantly, this definition allows to turn the study of instances of migrantisation into an analytical lens for investigating transformations in contemporary border and citizenship regimes.

1. Introduction

In August 2015 Al Jazeera announced it would no longer use the term ‘migrant’ to designate people trying to cross the Mediterranean in overcrowded boats, calling them ‘refugees’ instead. The news agency explains this move on its webpage as follows: ‘The umbrella term migrant is no longer fit for purpose when it comes to describing the horror unfolding in the Mediterranean. It has evolved from its dictionary definitions into a tool that dehumanizes and distances, a blunt pejorative’ (Malone, 2015). Following this view, the word migrant has become a toxic term that should be abandoned because it stigmatizes people labelled as such.

Similar observations have been made by critical migration studies scholars. Bridget Anderson notes that, at the current conjuncture, the term migrant is no longer reducible to a neutral description of persons crossing international borders. Following Anderson ‘“migration” signifies problematic mobility.’ Accordingly, ‘not all mobility is subject to scrutiny, but “migration” already signals the need for control and in public discourse is often raced and classed’ (Bridget Anderson, 2017: 1532). Since migration, and in particular the mobility of the poor, is regulated through laws on citizenship and...
normed by notions of national belonging, the historically and geographically contingent problematization of the mobility and presence of some people as ‘migration’ can be used as an analytical lens to study transformations in migration politics and related border and citizenship regimes. Hence, Anderson calls for turning ‘the problematization of migration into a tool for inquiry’ (1535).

In this article we follow Anderson’s call of ‘problematizing the problem of migration’ (ibid.) by starting from the apparently banal question: Who is a migrant in Europe today? We engage with this question to expose and challenge the ‘the nation-state point of view of spatial mobility’ (Favell, 2007: 271) which underpins the framing of migration as a problem requiring constant monitoring as well as governmental interventions of regulation and control. This nation-state point of view is carried by dominant understandings of migration as movement to and residence in nation-state B from nation-state A. The latter inform policy-making as well as statistical and academic knowledge production on migration. The United Nations (UN) define a migrant, for instance, ‘as a person who moves to a country other than his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year’ (UN, 2002: 11). Nation-state centered understandings of migration also dominate the thinking of wider publics about migration, thus shaping migration-related political debates. In an overview of selected contemporary dictionaries, Neil Shumsky (2008) shows that most definitions of the verb ‘to immigrate’ emphasize the idea of migrants as ‘coming from another country’. The entry in the Miriam-Webster Online Dictionary stresses, for example, that ‘to immigrate’ would mean ‘especially: to come into a country of which one is not a native for permanent residence.’ Such nation-state centered understandings of migration are then problematic because they are rest on a deeply entrenched methodological nationalism that implicates three epistemological traps which continue to shape much of contemporary research (and political debate) about migration: first, the ontologization of ‘migrants’ as ready-available objects of research, which goes hand in hand with, secondly the naturalization of the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki, 1995), a world of nation-states that are thought of as stable spatial containers, is adopted as the unquestioned starting point for research. What slips into the background are the many practices of (discursive, legal, social and practical) bordering and boundary drawing through which some people are enacted, problematized and targeted as migrants. By placing these processes of migrantisation at the centre of attention, we pursue two interrelated objectives with this article.

In brief, methodological nationalism implies a conception of societies as nationally bounded containers (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003). Within this ‘container thinking’ migrants can only emerge as intruders who disturb and endanger the alleged cultural homogeneity and social equilibrium of the imagined community of national citizens. Hence, ‘migrants’ emerge as a distinct group of people waiting to be studied, while the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki, 1995), a world of nation-states that are thought of as stable spatial containers, is adopted as the unquestioned starting point for research. What slips into the background are the many practices of (discursive, legal, social and practical) bordering and boundary drawing through which some people are enacted, problematized and targeted as migrants. By placing these processes of migrantisation at the centre of attention, we pursue two interrelated objectives with this article.

First, we want to overcome the three epistemological traps implicated by nation-state centred conceptions of migration. To this end, we develop an alternative conception of migration that highlights the ‘making of migration’ (Tazzioli, 2020), that is, the practical, legal and discursive processes and practices through which some people are enacted as migrants. We propose an alternative definition of a migrant that is inspired by the autonomy of migration (AoM) literature (Bojadžijev & Karakayali, 2010; Mezzadra, 2011; Moulier Boutang, 2007; Papadopoulos, Stephenson, & Tsianos, 2008; Scheel, 2019). This definition adopts the perspective of mobility and puts ‘border struggles’ (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013) at the centre of the analysis. Adopting the perspective of mobility puts the category of the migrant on the move. As a result, migration emerges as something that is contingent, relational and multiple. In this way, and this is our second objective, our definition challenges the essentialization and de-historization of ‘migrants’ as a stable sociological category.

It should be noted that this intervention is not only directed at mainstream migration studies, that is, scholarship that uses nation-state centric understandings of migration, such as those carried by the UN-definition cited above, as a starting point of research. We also want to contribute to lines of thought and inquiry that are critical and reflexive in regards to their object of study. Since the publication of Andreas Wimmer’s and Nina Glick-Schiller’s (2002, 2003) seminal work on methodological nationalism, various strands of scholarship have developed inspiring suggestions of how to overcome this epistemic bias in the study of migration. Examples include the proposal of a transnational
paradigm that moves beyond the national-container model of society by studying transnational networks, connections and social spaces of ‘in-betweenness’ that migrants forge by living ‘here’ and ‘there’ (Glick-Schiller, Basch, & Szanton Blanc, 1995). Yet, as we elaborate below, the transnational paradigm remains haunted by methodological nationalism: First, because scholars often focus on a particular group of migrants with a shared ‘national identity’ and, second, because the (criss-)crossing of national dividing lines still remains the defining feature of who a migrant is. Also the proposal of scholars working with the ‘new mobilities paradigm’ (Büscher & Urry, 2009) fails to offer a viable solution. Their proposal to de-exceptionalize migration by understanding it as one form of mobility among many others essentially suggests to ignore the continued relevance of practices of bordering and boundary-drawing implicated by the national order to things. The latter cannot simply be ignored because they do have very real consequences for people that are labelled and targeted as migrants. What is needed to resolve this conundrum is an alternative conception of a migrant that starts from the perspective of mobility in order to transcend the epistemic traps implicated by state-centric definitions of migration.

In this article we develop such an alternative definition of a migrant from the perspective of mobility which takes inspiration from the AoM literature. We develop and demonstrate the usefulness of this definition in three moves. In the first section we show that the nation-state point of view only began to dominate understandings of migration from the 1920s onwards before explaining how methodological nationalism and the epistemological traps implicated by it continue to shape much of the research on migration. Based on a review of the most important existing attempts to overcome methodological nationalism and statist conceptions of migration, the second section develops an alternative definition of migration from the perspective of mobility. The third section illustrates through three empirical examples how our AoM-inspired definition of a migrant can be put to use in order to demonstrate its analytical and political surplus value.

The three examples we chose relate to processes of migrantisation implicated by (1) the Schengen visa regime of the European Union (EU), (2) the integration paradigm and (3) the bordering of Europe’s southern frontier in the Mediterranean. We chose these three cases to highlight the wide variety of practices of migrantisation and related processes of bordering and boundary drawing which cannot be captured by state-centric understandings of migration that declare the crossing of geopolitical demarcation lines the defining feature of who a migrant is. All three cases show that it is, ironically, the proliferation and de-localization of border controls and processes of boundary drawing beyond geopolitical dividing lines that plunges state-centric understandings of migration into a deep epistemic crisis (Mezzadra, 2015). Moreover, each case allows us to highlight particular aspects of our alternative definition of a migrant: the Schengen visa regime illustrates that processes of migrantisation operate along lines of class, race, age and gender and that people try to escape their migrantisation in multifarious ways. The integration paradigm highlights, in turn, that migrantisation is strongly intertwined with processes of racialization and that migrantisation is, consequently, a matter of degrees. The study of processes of migrantisation operating in Europe’s southern borderzone shows, in turn, that the enactment of some people as migrants is both relational and contingent.

Finally, our three cases studies highlight that we developed our definition of a migrant in the context of our research on Europe and its border-zones. Hence, it is key to clarify that our alternative conception of a migrant is a situated one. And while the main contribution of this paper is theoretical, we do not intend to provide a universal, definite answer to the question “who is a migrant?”. We rather hope that our alternative definition will be put to work and nuanced in light of the specific migration contexts. At the same time we are confident that our definition and its impetus to de-naturalise the national order of things and to re-focus the analysis on processes of migrantisation provide useful epistemico-methodological points for the study of migration, border and citizenship politics in contexts beyond Europe, not the least because – contrary to the dominant narrative – Extra-European states were, historically, the first to deploy territorial immigration controls and to embrace the nation-state point of view on migration (Vigneswaran, 2020).
2. Methodological Nationalism and the Study of Migration

With his *Laws of Migration* E.G. Ravenstein (1885) provided the first attempt of a systematic analysis and theorization of migratory movements. Ravenstein’s analysis focused on migration in the United Kingdom and was based on the results of the 1881 census. What is striking about Ravenstein’s analysis is that it did not distinguish analytically between internal and international migration, although his analysis also included a ‘national element’ (the United Kingdom consisted of the ‘nations’ or ‘kingdoms’ of England, Ireland and Scotland at that time). Instead, Ravenstein treated all population movements – no matter if they involved the crossing of national borders between one of the three kingdoms or only the crossing of administrative boundaries between counties – as part of the same phenomenon (cf. Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003, p. 587). What this example highlights is that the predominance of the nation-state point of view in the study of migration and the conflation of migration with ‘international migration’, that is, movement to and settlement in one nation-state from another one, is a relatively recent development.

In his seminal analysis of the consolidation of the category ‘international migration’ in population statistics, Yann Stricker (2019, p. 469) shows how the emergence of this contested category was interrelated ‘with a shift from an imperial to an internationalist point of view’ on human mobility. Attempts of the International Labor Organization (ILO) to produce statistics on people on the move – most notably workers – on a global scale raised concerns about the meaning of borders within the British Empire, which comprised colonies, protectorates, dominions, mandates and the British Raj at that time. The ILO’s request to provide data on the movements of workers who cross an *international border* was greeted with great skepticism by British officials who insisted that movements within the empire were not international in character. The underlying fear was that the use of national dividing lines in the conception of migration by the ILO and the production of respective migration statistics could fuel claims for independence of nationalistic movements within the British and other colonial empires (Stricker, 2019, pp. 475-476). Hence, British officials insisted on labelling emigration from the United Kingdom to the dominions and colonies – which was promoted by the UK government after the First World War – as ‘oversea settlement’. The efforts British officials invested in maintaining this imperial view on human mobility reflected the fear that ‘the category of the nation in categorizing people on the move carried with it the danger of naturalizing nations as territorial units, and this could potentially undermine imperial rule’ (ibid, 480). By showing that the emergence of the nation-state point of view on migration is a relatively recent development Stricker’s careful analysis demonstrates that conceptions of migration are contingent and thus contestable and contested.

Besides efforts of British officials to safeguard the imperial view by drawing conceptual distinctions between mobility within colonial empires and mobility between nation-states, the nation-state point of view became hegemonic after the First World War. Processes of nation-building fostered a new conception of ‘the people’ along ethnic and/or racial lines which began to replace a “civic” notion of peoplehood. “‘The people’ began to mean a nation united by common ancestry and a shared homeland, no matter where its members might have wandered” (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003, p. 587). This shift had, of course, implications for the understanding of migration. Migrants began to be imagined as ethnically different, racialized subjects who continued to hold memberships of their ancestral homelands. In brief, migrants began to be conceived as ‘foreigners’. Hence, the consolidation of the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki, 1995) – the division of the world into a set of nation-states inhabited by culturally and/or racially distinct people – heralded the emergence of nation-state point of view as the dominant view on migration. By the end of the First War, migrants were increasingly ‘seen as politically dangerous and nationally or racially fundamentally different others’ whose presence endangered the isomorphism between the imagined community of (national) citizens, the sovereign state order and its territory (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003, p. 589). The social sciences played an important role in the consolidation of the nation-point of view on migration. The conception of society as a social order contained within the territorial limits of the nation-state became the unquestioned, often implicit starting point of social theory and social scientific research, including the study of migration (592). In other words, methodological nationalism became the modus operandi of most of the social sciences, including the emergent field of migration studies.
Methodological nationalism has been identified as a complex epistemic bias that has and continues to shape the research agendas and conceptual frameworks of entire disciplines. In a nutshell, methodological nationalism refers to a research practice that conflates societies with nation-states by using the latter as unquestioned units of analysis. Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick-Schiller distinguish between three variants of methodological nationalism: First, a wide-spread ignorance of how nationalism and the formation of nation-states shaped and continue to shape some of the most important concepts of social and political theory. In brief, ‘[n]ation-state principles were so routinely structured into foundational assumptions of theory that they vanished from sight’ (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003: 579). This is also the case for state-centric understandings of migration, as we explain below. Second, a naturalization of the modern nation-state as the universal mode of political organisation and belonging by ‘taking for granted nationally bounded societies as the natural unit of analysis (579). In this way ‘naturalization [has] produced the container model of society that encompasses a culture, a polity, an economy and a bounded social group’ (ibid). This ‘container-thinking’ underpins, third, the territorial limitation of social scientific analysis to the boundaries of the nation-state (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2002: 307). Through the conception of nation-states as spatial containers of society ‘[t]he nation-state and modern society become conceptually as well as historically indistinguishable’ (Chernilo, 2011: 99). Importantly, this ‘territorial trap’ continues to shape research questions, theories and debates of entire disciplines, as the political geographer John Agnew (1994) has famously argued in relation to International Relations. To this we may add a fourth form of methodological nationalism that Roger Brubaker calls groupism: the tendency to conceive of groups, often along ethnic, national or racial lines, as ‘internally homogeneous and externally bounded entities’ and ‘fundamental units of social analysis’ (Brubaker, 2002, p. 164).

The crucial point is that scholars import all four variants of methodological nationalism into their research if they adopt state-centred understandings of migration. By state-centred we mean conceptions of migration that make the division of the world into a set of mutually exclusive nation-states the unquestioned reference point for the determination of what migration is. Such conceptions of migration as movements from nation A to nation B result from the ignorance of how the formation of modern nation-states has influenced predominant understandings of migration, which in turn help to reify the naturalisation of the national order of things. As a result, state-centered conceptions of migration silently accept the claimed prerogative of nation-states to control access to their territories. They also normalise the related need of nation-states to classify and govern cross-border mobility as ‘migration’ in order to constitute and reproduce themselves through repetitive acts of state-power (Favell, 2007). Ultimately, statist conception of migration thus invisibilize nation-state practices of bordering and boundary-making that enact some people as migrants in the first place.

The consolidation of the nation-state point of view on migration described above also nurtures the still dominant idea that migrants are ‘uprooted’ and need to be integrated in the nationally bounded receiving society which is viewed as culturally homogeneous (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003, p. 591). Hence, state-centred conceptions of migration continue to carry the idea of a stark distinction between (native) citizens and (foreign) migrants in need of ‘integration’. This is also why the continued use of hegemonic state-centred understandings of migration is problematic for critical migration studies scholars: they import the idea of a stark distinction between migrants and citizens along lines of ethnicity and national belonging, even if only implicitly, back into their research.

The tacit assumptions carried by state-centered conceptions of migration has, however, significant consequences for the conception of the phenomenon under study as they implicate three epistemological traps that continue to shape much of the research on migration. First, the adoption of state-centred understandings of migration implicates an ontologization of migrants as ready-available subjects of research. This ontologization of migrants is coupled with the reification of a binary distinction between (foreign) migrants and (native) citizens along lines of (citizenship) status and (national) belonging. It often results in the reduction of migration research to research about migrants, their practices, cultural preferences, experiences and so forth, which are assumed to be distinct from the outset. This ‘migrantology’ thus both illustrates and reifies the distinction between (foreign) migrants and (native) citizens which informed this kind of research in the first place (Römhild, 2017, p. 70). Secondly, state-centred conceptions of migration naturalise the national order of things, which in turn invisibilises the discourses of belonging, practices of bordering, legal norms and so forth that enact some people as migrants, as we have explained above. Thirdly, the adoption of state-centred
understandings of migration reifies the framing of migration as a security issue in need of close monitoring, regulation and control. The reason is that within the conception of societies as nationally bounded containers migrants can only emerge as disruptive factors i.e. as ‘intruders’ who disturb and potentially destroy the imagined isomorphism between the people and the nation which is, at once, understood as a culturally homogenous community, a group of solidarity and a citizenry that votes and is represented by the sovereign (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003). In this way, the container-thinking underpinning state-centred conceptions of migration contributes to the securitization of migration. The critical security studies scholar Didier Bigo underlines this effect of methodological nationalism, arguing that ‘the securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our conception of the state as a body or a container of the polity’ (2002: 65). In the next section we therefore develop a definition of a migrant which moves beyond state-centred conceptions of migration and the epistemological traps implicated by them.

3. Who is migrant? De-naturalizing the national order of things

There is Since the pioneering work of Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002) numerous scholars have made proposals on how to transcend methodological nationalism in the study of migration. In this context methodological transnationalism, i.e. the study of practices, connections and communities that crisscross international borders, is one of the most influential approaches (Amelina & Faist, 2012). A transnational methodology ‘tries to capture how they [migrants] simultaneously become part of the places where they settle and stay connected to a range of other places at the same time’ (Levitt, 2012: 495). In this way transnationalism permits to move beyond the national container model of society and the territorial limitation implicated by it. However, scholars of transnationalism often craft their unit of study as a bounded ‘migrant’ community that is defined by a shared identity along lines of ethnicity and nationality (Glick-Schiller, 2010: 111).

This form of ‘groupism’ (Brubaker, 2002) is particularly pronounced in diaspora studies. It is basically the epistemic starting point and modus operandi of a field of study investigating the identities, experiences and practices of distinct groups of people defined along ethnic or national lines that have been dispersed across several geographic locations and even continents through expulsion, colonial conquest and slavery or armed conflict. The treatment of these people as a distinct group of ‘diasporic people’ is justified with the assumption of a shared ‘long distance nationalism’ (Benedict Anderson, 2006) which often involves a shared experience of eviction and displacement. Importantly, it supposedly functions as the pre-dominant source of identity for a diaspora of people, motivating them to engage in cultural and social activities as well as political mobilizations whose central reference point is a ‘lost home’ or ancestral territory (Banerjee, MacGuisness, & McKay, 2012). Ultimately, diaspora studies overcome one form of methodological nationalism – territorial limitation – by embracing another one –namely: groupism. They do so by adopting a transnational analytical framework that follows cross-border connections, networks, social practices and political mobilizations of one particular group defined along ethnic or national lines. Moreover, many studies continue to use nation-states as units of analysis by analyzing and comparing the practices of one diaspora in two or more host-states, as Maria Koinova (2021) succinctly observes in her comprehensive overview of field.

However, even studies of transnationalism that succeed in avoiding ‘groupism’ (Brubaker, 2002) as their epistemic starting point and mode of inquiry remain haunted by methodological nationalism. The reason is that an expansion of the scope and range of the analysis beyond the national container does little to move scholars beyond statist understandings of migration (Favell, 2007: 270). Some of the most renowned proponents of transnationalism rightly conclude that ‘[g]oing beyond methodological nationalism in the study of current migration thus may require more than a focus on transnational communities instead of the nation and its immigrants’ (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2002: 324). The same can be said of approaches that try to transcend methodological nationalism by simply shifting the analytical focus from the national to the local (Glick-Schiller & Çaglar, 2009) or global scale (Glick-Schiller, 2010).
The next approach that we discuss goes beyond a simple alteration of the spatial focus of the analysis. Instead, this approach aims at the ‘de-migranticisation of research on migration and integration’ (Bojadžijev & Römhild, 2014; Dahinden, 2016). Following Janine Dahinden (2016: 2209), migration and integration research constantly confirm ‘the idea of migrants as different from citizens and the perceived need for nation states to manage this difference [...]’ (2209). The reproduction of migration as a category of difference happens in particular when scholars use ‘migration or ethnicity as the central criterion of difference in research questions, research design, data collection, analysis and theory [...]’ (2211). Hence, Dahinden proposes three strategies to de-migranticize research on migration: First, she proposes to clearly distinguish between common-sense categories of migration as they are used by actors in the everyday, particularly in migration policy discourse, on the one hand, and analytical research categories on the other hand (2213). Second, Dahinden suggests to align migration theory more closely with other social science theories as a way to de-exceptionalise migration (2214). Third and finally, she calls for re-orienting the focus of analysis away from ‘migrant populations’. Rather than distinguishing between ‘migrant’ and ‘non-migrant’ populations from the outset, Dahinden (2016, p. 2218) suggests to begin the analysis with ‘overall populations’ and to make it a question of empirical inquiry if and how ‘migration and ethnicity [matter] in the phenomenon being investigated.’

While we share Dahinden’s assessment of migration studies, we have doubts about her proposal to de-migrantize migration research. The reason is that, as Dahinden acknowledges herself, differences between migrants and non-migrants do exist as ‘empirical facts’ precisely because of the existence of an institutionalized state migration apparatus that ‘creates specific social realities and inequalities’ (2016: 2211). Rather than simply bracketing these differences through an analysis that ‘investigate[s] social processes in general and then evaluate[s] the role of migration and ethnicity in them’ (Dahinden, 2016: 2213), we propose a framework that studies how, and through what kind of practices, some people are constituted and governed as migrants. What is needed is not a de-migrantization of migration research, but a conception of migration that accounts for the making of migration (Tazzioli, 2020) - that is for the political and legal processes of migrantization that are inherent to the national order of things.

With ‘migrantisation’ we refer to the enactment of certain subjects as ‘migrants’, that is, as ‘people out of place’ who do not (really) belong to the places and societies they inhabit (Sharma, 2020, p. 4). Processes of migrantisation involve heterogenous practices of bordering and boundary-drawing that nation-states rely on in order to establish and reproduce themselves as a bounded territory, people and jurisdiction. In this context it is important to note that processes of migrantisation are heavily intertwined with processes of racialization without being reducible to the latter. The reason is that the figure of the migrant has become a substitute for the biological notion of race in racist discourses and practices with the onset of the era of decolonization and the reversal of population movements between the (former) colonies and the (former) colonial powers (Balibar, 1995a). In the post-colonial world divided into a set of mutually exclusive nation-states, migrants are constituted as the ‘quintessential Other’ and ‘made to be outside of the nation even as they live on national territory’ (Sharma, 2020, p. 4). This enactment of migrants ‘as the others of National-Natives’ (13) often features processes of racialization (Balibar, 1995b). Hence, a focus on processes of migrantisation means putting at the core of the analysis the racializing mechanisms through which some people are turned into ‘migrants’ and the colonial legacies of the racialised governing of mobility. Indeed, as Nandita Sharma (2020) demonstrates, the racialized category of migrant has historically been used to designate people from former colonies. The migrantisation of subjects from the British Empire was ‘prefigured by imperial needs to discipline and contain a labor force freed from slavery’ (Sharma, 2020, p. 25). Hence, the enactment of (some) people as migrants often features processes of racialization fraught with histories of colonization and de-colonization. Nevertheless, it is important to retain a distinction between processes of migrantisation and racialization and to consider ‘national peculiarities, context-specific moments and interactions with other power relations, like classism, sexism and queer/transphobia etc.’ in the analysis of the relationship between the two (Tudor, 2018, p. 1058). Before we introduce an understanding of migration that accounts for processes of migrantisation, we briefly discuss ‘the new mobilities paradigm’ (Büscher & Urry, 2009) as another important approach seeking to challenge methodological nationalism. On the back of often enthusiastic accounts of globalization, scholars like John Urry (2007) or Tim Cresswell (2006) claim that the world has become more mobile. Accordingly, the social sciences need a new conceptual and methodological
What all these contributions share is the attempt to decenter the focus on migration through a broader analysis of mobilities more generally. In our view, this move does however little to transcend statist conceptions of migration. It rather risks to deprive migration of its distinct character. What distinguishes migration from other forms of mobility is that it is the fabrication of clashes with practices of statecraft. ‘It is precisely the control which states exercise over borders that defines international migration as a distinct social process’ (Zolberg, 1989: 405). This is why the nation-state is not reducible to one actor among others ‘in questions of international migration’ (Glick-Schiller & Salazar, 2013: 192). Nation-states do not just shape migration via their policies. They constitute it. This is why Abdelmalek Sayad (2004) aptly describes the modern nation-state as a vast discrimination machine that, in order to reproduce itself, constantly draws and polices a clear demarcation line between those who belong to the national citizenry and those who do not. These consist in the manifold practices, devices, actors, institutions, discourses, sites, technologies of bordering that are mobilized to draw and guard this distinction, which enact migration as an intelligible reality. Nicholas De Genova aptly summarizes this observation as follows: ‘it is the bordered definition of state territoriality that constitutes particular forms and expressions of human mobility as “migration” and classifies specific kinds of people who move as “migrants”. Borders make migrants’ (De Genova, 2015: 4; italics in original). Without borders, there would be neither migration nor migrants, but only mobility and people on the move (De Genova, 2013: 253). It is this intimate and mutually constitutive relationship between migration and the bordering practices of nation-states which distinguishes migration from other forms of mobility.5

Hence, we need to bring attention to what is invisibilised by state-centered conceptions of migration: the practices of bordering through which nation-states constitute and govern some people as migrants in order to reproduce themselves as territorially-bounded, culturally distinct, imagined communities and sovereign orders. We therefore propose to invert, as suggested by authors like Kalir (2013) or Bassaram and Guild (2017), the nation-state centered perspective of statist conceptions of migration. But in contrast to the former we also place the practices of bordering through which nation-states enact and govern some people as migrants center-stage. We achieve this by taking inspiration from the AoM literature which calls on scholars to investigate contemporary border, migration and citizenship regimes from the perspective of migrants’ (Bojadžijev & Karakayali, 2010; Mezzadra, 2011; Moulier Boutang, 2007; Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Scheel, 2019). As suggested by its name, the AoM’s central hypothesis attributes moments of autonomy, that is moments of uncontrollability and excess, to migratory practices and movements. Originally developed as a counter-narrative to the politically problematic metaphor of Fortress Europe, the AoM has been developed into a heuristic model that permits scholars to investigate contemporary border regimes and migratory processes from migrants’ perspective with a particular focus on their ‘border struggles’ (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013). Through this inversion of the state-centred perspective of conventional migration studies the AoM allows to highlight the otherwise invisibilised practices of bordering and boundary drawing through which nation-states enact and govern some people as migrants.
However, AoM-scholars have so far not sufficiently considered the implications that the inversion of the state-centred perspective in the study of borders and migration has for the conception of who a migrant is. Instead, they often continue to use, even if only implicitly, conventional understandings of migration as movement from one national container to another one, thus importing the nation-state point of view of migration and related epistemological traps back into their research. What has so far not been considered in the AoM-literature is that the reversal of the state-centred perspective in the study of migration also makes it necessary to rethink the conventional understanding of migration as movement from one national container to another one. Hence, the following proposal of an alternative definition of a migrant from the perspective to mobility is also meant as a contribution to the AoM-literature.

Inspired by the AoM’s reversal of the nation-state point of view in the study of migration, and taking cue from the literatures discussed above, we therefore want to propose an alternative definition of a migrant that focuses on the struggles people have to engage in to move to or stay in a desired place. These struggles are ‘border struggles’ because they ‘take shape around the ever more unstable line between the “inside” and “outside”, between inclusion and exclusion’ (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013: 13). In this context it is important to note that we attribute a wide meaning to the notion of ‘struggle’, which does not necessarily imply a literal fight. It refers primarily to the efforts that people who are addressed and targeted as (potential) migrants have to undertake to access mobility and to defend their (contested) presence as people considered ‘out of place’. Hence, migrants’ struggles revolve around the clandestine subversion, evasion and mitigation of border controls as well as the appropriation of social, economic and political rights and resources. Building on the works of scholars like Bridget Anderson (2017), Nicholas De Genova (2013), Abdelmalek Sayad (2004), Nandita Sharma (2020), Alysxa Tudor (2018) or Aristide Zolberg (1981) we therefore understand a migrant as a person who, in order to move to or stay in a desired place, has to struggle against bordering practices that are implicated by the national order of things.

This definition moves beyond statist conceptions of migration and the epistemological traps implicated by them. First, our definition abandons the nation-state point of view on spatial mobility carried by statist conceptions of migration though the adoption of mobile subjects’ perspective. It thus permits scholars to de-naturalize the existence of nation-states by exposing their intrinsic logic (and constant challenge) to discriminate between native citizens and migrant others through practices of bordering and boundary drawing. In so doing, our definition re-directs scholarly attention from ‘migrants’ to the making of migration, that is, to processes of migrantisation that enact and govern some people as migrants in the first place. In this way, our definition moves, second, beyond the ontologization of migrants as ready-available objects of research. By exposing how people are enacted as migrants in multifarious, situated ways, our definition puts the very category of migrant into motion, grasping the legal, political and material struggles that shape the migrant condition in its heterogeneity and singularity. Finally, the reversal of the nation-state point of view, if combined with a focus on border struggles, also allows to transcend the third epistemological trap of methodological nationalism: the framing of migration as problem of government. Instead of seeing (and problematizing) migration like a state, to paraphrase James Scott (1999), we believe that such an understanding of migration as intertwined with practices of bordering and related border struggles enables scholars to see (and problematize) both the state and the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki, 1995) from the viewpoint of migrants.

4. Migration from the Perspective of Mobility: Studying Processes of Migrantisation

In this section we want to show how our definition of a migrant can be used in practice in order to demonstrate its analytical and political surplus value for the study of borders and migration. We do so by studying processes of migrantisation in three contexts, namely, (1) the Schengen visa regime, (2) policies aiming at the ‘integration’ of migrants and (3) the government of mobility at Europe’s southern frontier. Each case allows us to highlight particular aspects and analytical advantages of our definition of a migrant, as the following three subsections show. They also illustrate how our definition can be put to use. In brief, the first question to be raised in any research on ‘migration’ is
who is (not) enacted as a migrant in the situation under study and how and through what kind of
practices of border and boundary drawing is this migrantisation done? To answer this question,
scholars should identify and study those instances in which either human mobility or the presence
of some people are problematized and targeted as ‘migration’ in one way or another. These instances
may be found in sites of border and mobility control, as illustrated by our first and third case. Or they
may facilitate the segmentation of labor markets along racial lines and legal status, as suggested by
our third case. Or they may be animated by particular epistemic registers and related practices of
knowledge production, as highlighted by our second case. The crucial analytical task is then to study
the processes of migrantisation at work in these situations, the discourses, categorizations, taxono-
 mies and knowledge regimes they rely on, the processes of racialization they feature, their complex
relationships to with class, age, gender, sexual orientation, their implications for those labelled and
targeted as migrants and how the latter may try to negotiate, mitigate or escape their migrantisation.
By attending to these aspects, scholars will be able to show that processes of migrantisation are not
only highly heterogeneous and contingent, but also relational and contested.

4.1. The Schengen visa regime: enacting migrants, part I

Our first example concerns the visa regime of the EU. Visa policies are one of the oldest techniques
to outsource border controls beyond national demarcation lines. The imposition of a visa require-
ment enables the pre-screening and pre-selection of travellers before their departure (Zampagni,
2016). In the context of the Schengen visa regime, the criteria for the imposition of a visa requirement
on a specific country evaluate its population in terms of risks, ‘relating inter alia to illegal immigra-
tion, public policy and security’ (Council, 2001: 3). As the global map of the Schengen visa regime
shows, this partition of the world in ‘risky’ and ‘trustworthy’ populations reflects geo-political asym-
metries and socio-economic inequalities. However, not only high-income countries are exempt from
a visa requirement, but also former white settler colonies in Latin America i.e. countries with a large
share of the population of European origin. This seems to suggest that the imposition of a visa re-
quirement is also informed by racializing discourses just as it is fraud with colonial histories.

Official map of the Schengen visa regime: citizens of countries coloured in red need a visa to enter
the Schengen area (coloured in blue) for a period of up to 90 days. Citizens from countries coloured
in green are exempt from a visa requirement. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
For all those who are subject to a visa requirement, the border is first enforced in the consulates in their country of residence - and thus long before they have reached the EU's geopolitical borders. In the application procedure, the presumption of innocence is reversed: It is the applicant who has to prove in an interview and through the provision of numerous documents that – contrary to the statistical knowledge which justified the imposition of a visa requirement in the first place – she does not pose a migration or security threat (Bigo & Guild, 2005: 250). Hence, visa applicants are subjected to a culture of institutionalized distrust when they apply for a Schengen at the consulates (Scheel, 2017b). In practice any visa applicant will be denied access to mobility if she cannot convince consular staff of her ‘will to return’ to her country of departure.

If the visa application of a young man seeking to visit his brother in Europe is rejected because his intention to ‘leave the territory of the Member States before the expiry of the visa applied for’ could not ‘be ascertained’ (EP and Council, 2009: 12; emphasis added). He is enacted as a migrant by consular staff though he has never crossed a geopolitical border. Consular staff’s practices like posing questions about a person’s purpose of stay or verifying the authenticity of documents are performative because they bring into being and perform the very subject they seek to govern: a ‘migrant’. What the example of the consulate highlights are the temporal and imaginary aspects of processes of migrantisation. People like the young man wishing to visit his brother living in Europe are denied a Schengen visa because they are suspected of becoming a migrant. In the eyes of consular staff, they are embodying a migration risk – a potential future that is supposed to be prevented from its realization through the denial of a visa. Through this anticipatory risk assessment millions of people are enacted as potential migrants that have to be immobilized and kept in place. Importantly, this instance of migrantization is not captured by nation-state centered definitions of migration that posit the crossing of international borders as the central definitional criteria of a migrant. This central feature of statist conceptions of migration plunges the former in a deep epistemic crisis in the moment that practices of border control ‘are no longer entirely situated at the outer limits of territories, [...but] dispersed a little everywhere’ (Balibar, 2003: 1). In the consulates it are not the actions of an individual by which a person makes herself unilaterally a migrant, as assumed by state-centric definitions of a migration as movement from one national container to another. It are rather the bordering practices of countless street-level bureaucrats charged with controlling human mobility that enact (some) people as migrants. It is thus, ironically, the de-localization of border controls beyond the edges of nation-states that brings to the fore the methodological nationalism of statist definitions of a migrant by plunging them into an epistemic crisis.

In contrast, the definition of a migrant that we proposed in this paper is capable to account for this instance of migrantization because it replaces the crossing of international borders with a focus on the border struggles that people who are treated as migrants have to engage in to move to or stay in a desired place. In the case of the Schengen visa regime, border struggles are implicated by an unpredictable regime of institutionalized distrust that renders mobility to Europe as a scarce resource through the introduction of an entry-ticket (a Schengen visa) whose receipt is subject to requirements that do not correspond to the living and working conditions of a large share of the local population (Scheel, 2017b). Hence, many people engage in various tactics and practices in order to appropriate a Schengen visa within and against this vast control apparatus. They may for instance provide manipulated documents like job contracts or bank statements that support fictive biographies of people considered as ‘bona fide’ travelers by consular staff (Scheel, 2017a). Or they may be silent about the planned family visit in Europe and apply for a tourist visa instead because they know through rumors about previously rejected visa applications that having relatives in Europe is regarded as an indicator for a migration risk by consular staff (Scheel, 2017b). In all these cases people try to appropriate an entry-ticket to Europe by escaping their migrantisation by the Schengen visa regime.

4.2. The integration paradigm: enacting migrants, part II

The problematization and government of immigrants’ children and grandchildren as ‘second’ or ‘third generation’ migrants offers another illustration of the imaginary dimension of processes of
migrantisation. People labelled as such have never left their ‘country of usual residence’ and do therefore not qualify as migrants according to the UN-definition (Schinkel, 2013). However, since the emergence of the integration paradigm as a central cornerstone of migration policies in Europe the descendants of immigrants are labelled and targeted as ‘second’ and ‘third generation’ migrants by ‘integration policies’, even if they hold the citizenship of their country of residence (Guild, 2009: 12-13).

What is problematized in case of the integration paradigm is not so much the mobility of people labelled as migrants but their presence. This shows that the ‘sending-off to an elsewhere’ accomplished by processes of migrantisation does not always revolve around the crossing of national borders (Tudor, 2018, p. 1064). Through discourses and practices that treat them as if they have just arrived, people labelled as ‘foreign born’ (in the UK), ‘person with migration background’ (in Germany) or ‘second’ or ‘third generation’ migrants, people labelled as such are held in a perpetual state of arrival (Boersma & Schinkel, 2018). They are subjected to a life-long apprenticeship they have to serve in order to become full, legitimate members of an imagined (national) community of shared values (Bridget Anderson, 2013). By tying citizenship to a politics of belonging the integration paradigm renders citizenship a ‘virtue’ (Schinkel, 2010) or ‘a faculty to be learned (Bridget Anderson, 2013: 100).

This redefinition of citizenship as virtue has very real consequences for people labelled as migrants: they have to earn formal citizenship and permanent residency (Schinkel, 2010: 272). In practice, people labelled as migrants have to fulfil ever longer lists of acculturation and to constantly prove their moral worthiness and loyalty to the imagined community of shared values. This meritocratic understanding of citizenship as something to be earned also becomes manifest in the introduction of ‘citizenship tests’ across Europe since the 1990s (de Leeuw & van Wichelen, 2012). However, any process of integration presupposes a process of differentiation. In the context of Europe, this prior differentiation rests on a distinction between a (national) community of shared values and a culturally different, socially deficient subject in need of ‘integration’ (Schinkel, 2013). Such differentiation is achieved through the labelling of people as ‘second’ or ‘third generation’ migrants despite the fact they may hold formal citizenship of their country of residence in which they have, in many cases, been born and socialised. What the integration paradigm illustrates is that the labelling of people as ‘second’ or ‘third generation’ migrants constitutes a practice of bordering in itself. The term ‘migrant’ is ‘far from a value-free description of a person who has crossed an international border’ (Bridget Anderson, 2013: 44). It is rather a performative category through which either the mobility or the presence of people labelled as such is enacted as a problem of government requiring close monitoring and interventions of regulation and control (Grommé & Scheel, 2020).

Again, it is informative to consider who is not enacted as a migrant in this context. The fact that not all newcomers or their children are problematized as ‘migrants’ in need of ‘integration’ indicates that the label ‘migrant’ refers to a racialized subject. Whereas new arrivals from Australia or the United States and their offspring are usually not considered as migrants in need of ‘integration’ in Europe, Algerian immigrants in France or Turkish ‘guest workers’ in Germany and their offspring are persistently labelled as ‘(second and third generation’) migrants (Guild, 2009: 12). The salience of public debates on ‘forced marriages’, ‘genital mutilation’, ‘honour killings’, or the banning of ‘burqas’ and in some cases even the wearing of headscarves points to the importance of gender and family norms in anti-Muslim racisms informing practices of boundary drawing that enact Muslims living in Europe as eternal migrants, that is as socially deviant, deficient subjects who are in need of integration in an imagined community of shared values revolving around gender equality, sexual tolerance and laicism (Bonjour & Kraler, 2015; de Leeuw & van Wichelen, 2012; Fassin, 2010; Korteweg, 2017; Razack, 2004; Schinkel, 2013; Yilmaz, 2015).

What the integration paradigm thus demonstrates is that migration ‘doesn’t exist apart from a relationship to political structures, requirements, laws and regulations’ of the nation-state (Foucault, 1997 [1984]: 114). The labelling of people as ‘(second’ or ‘third generation’) migrants is implicated by the national order of things insofar as it through the drawing of boundaries between ‘native’ citizens and migrant ‘others’ that ‘the territorial nation-state society constitutes itself’ (Favell, 2007: 271) as an imagined community of shared values (Schinkel, 2017). To analyse processes of migrantisation implicated by the integration paradigm scholars should play close attention to how difference
is produced and translated into ‘otherness’ (Meissner & Heil, 2020), particularly in practices of knowledge production like statistics (Grommé & Scheel, 2020; Schinkel, 2013). They should also attend to how these processes of othering translate into legal norms, practices of bordering and ‘integration policies’ and how these affect and discriminate against people who are targeted as migrant ‘others’ in need of integration. What these analyses will discover is that processes of migrantisation do, in most cases, not operate along a simple binary distinction between ‘native’ citizens and migrant ‘others’. Rather, migrantisation is, more often than not, a matter of degrees, as related practices and processes of bordering and boundary-drawing mobilise complex and shifting taxonomies, indexes, categories and classification systems.

4.3. Bordering the European space of mobility: enacting migrants, part III

The workings of different migration categories, and their varying impact on people’s lives and journeys, highlight another important dimension of processes of migrantisation, namely their contingency and situatedness. Migrants are subjected to multifarious mechanisms of bordering and containment along their routes and these mechanisms interrelate with migrants’ changing juridical status. To show this, we follow the trajectory of non-European ‘migrant workers’ escaping the war in Libya and contrast their geographically varying enactment as migrants with the geographically equally varying treatment of migrant workers escaping the economic crisis in Southern Europe.

In 2011, when attempts to overthrow the Gaddafi regime developed into a full-fledged war, almost one million people crossed the border to Tunisia. Most Libyans were hosted by Tunisians through so-called ‘popular chains’. The thousands of ‘migrant workers’ from various Sub-Saharan countries who had been living in Libya were, in contrast, exempt from this hospitality. Most of them spent several months in Choucha refugee camp which was opened by UNHCR, holding up to 22,000 people in peak-times (Tazzioli, 2015, pp. 102-114). In Choucha, UNHCR examined the asylum claims of these war escapees. Since they had not fled a war in their country of origin, most applicants were rejected and considered as ‘people not of our concern’ by UNHCR.

Faced with the choice to stay in Tunisia under precarious conditions of illegality or to return to their often war-torn, crisis-ridden countries of origin many non-Libyan war escapees decided to move on to Europe, crossing the Mediterranean in overcrowded boats. The humanitarian border spectacle in the Mediterranean occludes the systematic stranding and illegalisation of the rescued once they have reached Europe. Due to the Dublin III Regulation, the rescued war escapees had been subjected to the spatial restriction of applying for asylum in the Schengen member state through which they had entered Europe, thus being chased around Europe as illegalised asylum seekers (Picozza, 2017).

What the trajectory of non-Libyan war escapees illustrates is how migrants, during their journeys, are subjected to different bordering processes that enact and govern them accordingly – as economic migrants, as rejected refugees, as bodies to be rescued, as irregular secondary movers etc. Hence, the trajectory of people from Choucha shows how administrative practices enact the same person as a migrant in temporally and geographically varying ways, depending on the spaces of governmentality the person traverses (Tazzioli, 2015).

Yet, statist conceptions of migration - like the UN-definition - overshadow, first, how particular bordering practices enact migrants in spatially and temporally varying ways and, secondly, that the enactment of some people as migrants always occurs in relation to others whose mobility and presence are normalized. To illustrate this relational aspect of processes of migrantisation we contrast the treatment of ‘migrant workers’ escaping the war in Libya with the treatment of European citizens escaping economic crisis in Southern Europe.

Since the economic crisis started in 2008, tens of thousands of mostly young people have left Southern Europe to look for jobs and better living conditions elsewhere. While the majority has moved to Northern Europe, some have escaped the economic crisis by moving to African countries, most notably from Spain to Morocco, but also from Italy and France to Tunisia or from Portugal to Angola.
Many accept to work in deskilled jobs, for instance in call centers in Tangier and Rabat. Most of these young ‘migrant workers’ enter Morocco and Tunisia as ‘tourists’ and live and work there as ‘over-stayers’ beyond the period of three months they are allowed to stay without a visa. While this praxis qualifies them as ‘illegals’, these young Europeans are usually not even considered as ‘migrants’, nor do they identify as such. They consider themselves ‘expats’ – a term which is exclusively used for ‘European or North American nationals who move abroad, mostly for work-related reasons, including the former colonies’ (Fechter & Walsh, 2010: 1199). Hence, the notion of the ‘expat’ emerges as a device of conceptual bordering assuring that neither the mobility nor the presence of white Westerners is problematized as ‘migration’.

This is reflected by the differential treatment both groups receive in the same space of governmentality: whereas new arrivals from Spain rarely encounter any problem to settle and work in Morocco people from Sub-Saharan countries face regular police controls, raids and deportation across the Algerian border (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Likewise, ‘expats’ from Italy and France in Tunisia are rarely asked for papers by the police, landlords or employers, while war escapees from Libya are regularly arrested. This differential treatment highlights that the problematization of certain individuals as ‘migrants’ operates not only in spatially and temporally contingent ways, but also in relation to others, whose mobility and presence are constituted as ‘unproblematic’.

In order to undo statist understandings of migration, it is key to interrogate who is racialized as a migrant here and now. This implies accounting for the fact that people are enacted as migrants (1) in geographically varying and temporally contingent ways and (2) in relation to others whose mobility or presence is normalized as ‘unproblematic’. In practice, this involves starting the analysis with an interrogation of the discourses, devices and mechanisms and practices of bordering that enact (some) people as migrants in the context under investigation. And this is precisely what our definition invites scholars to do by directing the analytical gaze from ‘migrants’, understood as ready-available subject of research, to the border struggles people labelled and governed as such have to engage in order to move to or stay in a desired place.

5. Conclusion

One of the main epistemic and political stakes which underpin the question “who is a migrant?” consists in not seeing migration like a state. By advocating for a refusal to adopt and identify with state-categories like “migrant” gestures towards a non-statist approach to migration (Sharma, 2020). In this article we have problematized and challenged statist understandings of migration that, by adopting the nation-state point of view of spatial mobility, conceive of migrants as subjects who move from one national container to another one. To counter both the methodological nationalism and the ontologization of migrants implicated by statist understandings of migration we have developed an alternative conception of migration that highlights the constitutive role that nation-states’ bordering practices play in the enactment of some people as migrants. By making the need to engage in border struggles (instead of the crossing of international borders) the defining criteria of a migrant, this conception is capable to transcend the epistemic crisis of statist understandings of migration. To conclude, we clarify three aspects of this conception of migration.

First, by investigating how (some) people are enacted as migrants through bordering practices means neither to focus exclusively on international borders, nor to entertain a narrow focus on international migration. Besides the fact that the very distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘international’ migration rests on the inside/outside distinction of the national container model of society that we seek to abandon with our conception of migration, there are numerous examples of people that have been enacted as migrants in the jurisdictions of their countries of citizenship, as illustrated in the section on the integration paradigm.

Secondly, by de-naturalizing the national order of thing and drawing attention to the making of migration, our definition unsettles the migrant/citizen divide. Indeed, the racialization of some people as “migrants” has historically been consolidated in opposition to the “citizen”: the question “who is a migrant?” can be answered only by interrogating who is enacted and racialized as a migrant here and
now. Thus, by destabilizing the notion of “migrant”, this paper has also indirectly unsettled the category of “citizen”.

Finally, by placing the bordering practices of nation-states at the center of attention we do not intend to overlook other factors that contribute to the production and government of migration – such as processes of migrant labor exploitation or geopolitical power asymmetries. Rather, our point is to stress that these factors are often mediated and articulated by bordering practices of nation-states and what we have called, more broadly, ‘the national order of things’ (Malkki, 1995). This implies, however, that the bordering practices of nation-states cannot be taken as singular self-standing objects of critique. On the contrary, we should explore by studying processes of migrantization how the national order of things is situated within a geopolitical context that is characterized by deep asymmetries in terms of access to mobility, by investigating how class, gender, (dis-)ability, sexuality, ‘race’ and nationality articulate each other in determining restrictions to freedom of movement. In this way, scholarly engagement with migrant struggles and processes of migrantization can provide an analytical angle for studying current transformations in regimes of government and capital accumulation. Learning not to “see like a state” (Scott, 1999) is ultimately the primary endeavor that the analytical lens of migration pushes us to engage in.

6. **Endnotes**

You must include endnotes. **Author note:** endnotes are below due to formatting settings of Microsoft Word

**Acknowledgements**

Acknowledgements should follow immediately after the conclusion. **Author note:** will be included after article acceptance

**Funding information.** Authors are required to provide funding information, including relevant agencies and grant numbers with linked author’s initials. Correctly-provided data will be linked to funders listed in the Fundref registry. **To be added after peer review**

**References**


**Endnotes**

1 There exist of course other definitions of a migrant. These are, however, not less statist than the UN-definition that we use as an example in the following. For instance, the ‘IOM defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is’ (cited from: https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#Migrant on 18th November 2016).


3 In this article we refer to both immigrants and emigrants when we say ‘migrants’. The reason is that emigration and immigration are the inseparable two sides of the same coin as migration scholar Abdelmalek Sayad (2004) has emphasized time and again. A migrant is thus both an immigrant and an emigrant at the same time. To separate the processes of immigration and emigration analytically, means adopting either the perspective of the country of origin or of the receiving country. Such a statist conception of migration is, however, precisely what we criticize and abandon in this article.

4 In the following we use the idiom of ‘enactment’ to emphasize that ‘migrants’ do not exist as given realities. They have to be brought into being and performed through a range of re-iterative practice that constitute some people as migrants by addressing them as such. Put differently, practices of bordering and knowledge production enact (that is: bring into being and perform) that to which they refer. Such understanding of enactment as an alternative term for performativity has been developed in Science and Technology Studies (Mol, 2002; Scheel, Ruppert, & Ustek-Spilda, 2019). In the following we loosely refer to this notion of enactment to highlight the contingent and contested character of what we call processes migrantisation.

5 The observation that borders play a crucial role in the constitution of migration also holds for so-called ‘internal’ migration. The latter is usually defined as involving the crossing of administrative
boundaries within nation-states. In this way internal migration is distinguished from 'residential mobility' which is defined as 'involving shorter-distance movements within administrative areas' (Stillwell, Daras, Bell, & Lomax, 2014).

6 The member states of the Schengen area maintain a common visa regime for short term visa with a validity of up to 90 days. Since there are no border controls between the 26 member states of the Schengen area, a Schengen visa usually allows its holder to travel across all member states of the Schengen area. People have to apply for a Schengen visa at the consulate representing the member state in which they which to spend most of the time of their stay. While the EU has tried to 'harmonize' the rules and procedures for application and decision-making procedures through s shared Visa Code (EP and Council, 2009) as well as various handbooks, both procedures are still characterized by a vast heterogeneity and inconsistency across the approximately 3.500 consular posts that the 26 Schengen member states maintain worldwide (cf. Infantino, 2016; Scheel, 2019).

7 See: http://diasporaenligne.net/immigration-le-maroc-accueille-des-travailleurs-pauvres-espagnols/ (01.08.2021)


9 Most of the 20 Spaniards interviewed in Tangier by Lotte Rooijendijk (2013) for her Master thesis reported for instance that they work and reside in Morocco as 'tourists', though this status neither entitles them to employment nor to stay for longer than 90 days, a period most interviewees had exceeded at the time of the interview. On this point see also: http://lejour-naldusiecle.com/2013/06/12/quand-les-espagnols-entrent-clandestinement-au-maroc-pour-y-travailler/ (10.10.2021).