Beyond Cooperation: The Role of Origin Countries in Deportation Efforts, Evidence from Mexico (1942 to 1964)

Abstract:

For deportations to be carried out, host countries must secure inter-state cooperation with origin countries where they seek to deport noncitizens. However, origin countries may decide to cooperate or resist cooperation. This paper pushes the scholarship by exploring why some origin countries are willing to go beyond cooperation in readmission processes and also become proactive actors by encouraging and promoting the deportation of their citizens despite the economic and political costs. This paper unpacks this puzzle by analyzing why the Mexican government became a proactive actor in facilitating the deportation of its citizens from the 1940s to the 1960s. Through examining over six hundred pieces of archival data from the U.S and Mexican national archives, I argue that Mexico became a proactive actor as a strategy for addressing its domestic concerns at the regional and local level and for cultivating its diplomatic relationship with the U.S government and the benefits that came with such relation including the continuation of the Bracero Program, the largest guest worker program, which for Mexico was crucial for offsetting unemployment pressures and stimulating development. This paper advances the scholarship in two ways: the paper provides insights into how Mexico, a country with the highest flows of deportation in the Western Hemisphere, has managed influxes of deportations and how origin countries shape the deportation efforts of host countries.

Keywords: Deportation, Mexico-U.S. migration, unauthorized migration, archives, Bracero Program

Introduction

On October 18, 1954, at 4 p.m., the SS *Emancipación,* an 1800-ton steel construction passenger-cargo vessel owned by the Mexican company Transportes Marítimos y Fluviales, S.C.L in Mexico City[1] departed Port Isabel, Texas headed for Veracruz, Mexico. Inside the vessel were 800 Mexican deportees, including men, women, and children. After sailing roughly sixty hours through the Gulf of Mexico, the *Emancipación* arrived in Veracruz. Awaiting the Mexican deportees were officials from Mexico's Immigration Services. After exiting the vessel, deportees were held in warehouses and were processed by Mexican immigration officials. Repeaters who

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[1] Letter from Joseph M. Swing, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to Joe M. Kilgore, member of U.S House of Representatives, describing the SS *Emancipación* 1954, Research Group 85, Box 21936, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

had previously been deported were taken into custody and sent to Mexico City or other states across the interior of Mexico as a form of punishment. First time deportees were released in Veracruz.[2] This was one of the many voyages the SS *Emancipación* made to transport Mexican deportees from the U.S. Why did the Mexican government provide the U.S government with the modes of transportation to deport its citizens and why did the Mexican government punish Mexicans by moving them into the interior of the country against their will despite the political and economic consequences?

This paper explores why the Mexican government became a proactive actor in facilitating the deportation of their citizens from the U.S from the 1940s to the 1960s. The concept of proactiveness in facilitating deportation means going beyond traditional acts of inter-state cooperation in readmission processes. Traditional acts of inter-state cooperation in readmission processes involves origin countries confirming the nationality of citizens subject to removal, issuing immigration authorities from host countries with travel documents to carry out the deportation of their citizens, and admitting deportees into the country. However, proactiveness entails origin countries taking the initiative regarding when and how to deport their citizens from host countries in dialogue with host countries. Proactiveness consists of origin countries promoting and encouraging deportation and providing host countries with the means, including infrastructure and personnel to expedite deportations and mechanisms to deter re-emigration.

Throughout the 1940s to the 1960s, the Mexican government not only cooperated through traditional readmission processes but also provided the U.S government with the mechanisms to

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[2] Report written by Oran G. Pugh, U.S Border Patrol Inspector, about the boatlift from Port Isabel to Veracruz, October 27, 1954, Research Group 85, Box 21936, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

carry out the deportation of its citizens. The Mexican government requested U.S immigration authorities to extend vigilance at its border, provided the U.S government with boat contracts to remove Mexican deportees, detained Mexicans that had previously been deported from the U.S, and transported Mexican deportees into the interior of the country by train and airlifts as methods to deter Mexican deportees-from re-emigrating to the U.S. The actions of the Mexican government in the mid-20th century push us to consider why some origin countries are willing to go beyond traditional acts of inter-state cooperation in readmission procedures and become proactive actors despite the political and economic costs such as exposing deportees to various types of violence and abuse at the hands of immigration officials to potentially interrupting the flow of remittances.

Through analyzing over six hundred pieces of archival data in the U.S and Mexico, I argue that Mexico became a proactive actor during the 1940s through the 1960s not only based on pressures from the U.S government. Instead, Mexico was responsible for designing incentives on *how* to deport its citizens. The Mexican government facilitated and promoted the deportation of its citizens from the U.S as a strategy that allowed the country to address its domestic concerns at the regional and local level and further cultivate its relationship with the U.S government and the benefits that came with such relation. More specifically, through becoming a proactive actor by transporting deportees in inhumane conditions to displacing them into the interior of the country and away from their places of birth, as well as imprisoning repeaters sought to serve as a method to deter deportees from re-emigrating to the U.S permitting Mexico to shape the mobility of its citizens to prevent losing a cheap labor force in northern Mexico. Second, becoming proactive assisted the Mexican government in further cultivating its diplomatic relationship with the U.S,

during moments when the U.S government framed the rise of Mexican apprehensions at the border as an 'invasion.' By assisting the U.S government in deporting its citizens, the Mexican government became a key actor in implementing the U.S.'s deportation efforts. Lastly, Mexico's proactiveness in assisting the U.S implement its deportation policies facilitated the continuation of the Bracero Program, which for Mexico was crucial for offsetting unemployment pressures and for stimulating development through the remittances workers sent back home.

Based on the Mexican case, this study implies that origin countries may become proactive not only based on external pressures from host countries but also as a strategy for materialistic and intangible gains such as accessing resources and cultivating diplomatic ties with host countries. The conditions that may permit origin countries to become proactive actors and enter into dialogue and design policies with host countries depends on the vulnerability of the host country, specifically under moments when host countries cannot effectively implement deportation and border policies on their own and need the support of external actors in this case origin countries. However, this study implies that origin countries are less likely to become proactive when the origin country cannot address their domestic concerns through promoting deportations. Furthermore, origin countries are less likely to become proactive when they already receive concessions or access to resources from host country to address their domestic concerns through other policy related topics.

This paper seeks to make an empirical contribution to the scholarship on Mexico-U.S migration politics and a conceptual contribution to deportation studies. Through using multi-sided archival data in the U.S and Mexico, this paper traces how the Mexican government has responded to

deportations from the U.S. More specifically, through constructing historical depth, this paper explains the underlying rationale behind becoming a proactive actor in the U.S's deportation efforts throughout the 1940s to the 1960s. Furthermore, by introducing the concept of proactiveness, this paper showcases how origin countries shape the deportation efforts of host countries challenging assumptions that origin countries, particularly those outside the global north, are passive actors in the design of border and deportation policies implemented by host countries.

This paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the readmission agreement frameworks that host and origin countries use to carry out deportations and why origin countries cooperate or resist inter-state cooperation. The second section focuses on the methodology. I explain why I conducted multi-sided archival research in the U.S and Mexico and what the archival data revealed about how and when deportation negotiations and processes took place. The third section of the paper discusses under which political context Mexico became proactive in facilitating the deportation of its citizens and disaggregates how Mexico became a proactive actor. The following section discusses how and why Mexico's interests were deeply shaped by its domestic concerns, particularly at the regional and local levels. The last section discusses the implications of this case study and where more research is needed to advance deportation studies and research on Mexico-U.S migration politics.

To cooperate or not cooperate: The preferences of origin countries in managing deportations from host countries

For deportations to be carried out successfully, host countries must secure bilateral or multilateral readmission agreements with origin countries where they seek to deport noncitizens.

Readmission agreements outline protocols and the responsibilities of host and origin countries for carrying out and processing deportations. However, these agreements can be formal, informal, or a combination of both. Formal readmission agreements undergo a series of legislative and judicial review. On the other hand, informal agreements are kept hidden from the public. Informal agreements are verbal or written exchanges between government officials without formal legal standing, making it challenging for such agreements to undergo parliamentary or judicial scrutiny (Anderberg 2018). Scholars argue that over the last decade, host and origin countries are leaning towards adopting informal readmission agreements as they have 'low visibility' and are less likely to cause political backlash and negative attention from the press (Cassarino 2007).

Studies demonstrate, however, that formal or informal readmission agreements do not increase the rate of returns (Stutz and Trauner 2021), as origin countries vary the degree to which they are willing to cooperate (Cham and Adam 2023). Origin countries can either agree to cooperate or contest cooperation. Cooperation from origin countries consists of facilitating the process of deportations by confirming the nationality of individuals subject to removal, issuing proper documents to carry out deportations, and accepting deportees into the origin country. However, Zanker (2023) argues that there are different ways that origin countries resist cooperation, including reactive *incompliance* which involves delaying the process of providing identification documents and *proactive incompliance* meaning the complete refusal of cooperation by imposing moratoriums on deportation flights (Zanker and Altrogge 2022). For example, since 2020, over thirteen nations have resisted cooperation with the U.S by failing to accept their citizens in

deportation proceedings.[3] In 2019, the Gambian government implemented a moratorium on all deportation flights from the European Union and the U.S. This reluctance to cooperate with host countries complicates popular assumptions that countries of origin with less [economic] resources will 'give in' to the demands of more powerful host countries and also challenges externalist perspectives that foreign governments and intergovernmental agencies are key entities that shape the broader migration governance of origin countries (Gazzotti et al., 2023). Instead, such acts of resistance (Zanker 2023) have pushed scholars to explore how domestic and foreign policies (Adam et al., 2020) shape inter-state cooperation in readmission procedures.

More scholars are gradually moving beyond power-based arguments that stress that countries in the global north have more leverage than countries in the global south in negotiating and implementing migration policies (Tsourapas and Adamson 2020; Gazzotti et al., 2023). Instead, scholars have argued that origin countries particularly those outside the global north are not 'merely passive actors' (Mouthaan 2019) to the demands of foreign actors but domestic considerations and diplomatic relations with the deporting countries also shape their preferences in how they manage deportations. Adam and Cham (2023) showcase that origin countries may agree to cooperate not only because of external pressure, but also to appear legitimate and reliable to international actors. Origin countries therefore may decide to cooperate as a strategy not only to access materialistic resources but also intangible gains including status and recognition from external state and nonstate actors.

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[3] See, 'Immigration: "Recalcitrant" Countries and the Use of Visa Sanctions to Encourage Cooperation with Alien Removals', *Congressional Research Search*, July 10, 2020, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11025

On the other hand, origin countries may contest cooperation based on domestic considerations. Zanker and Altragge (2022) argue that the Gambia placed a temporary moratorium on deportation flights from the EU in 2019 out of security and economic concerns. For the Gambia, deportees were perceived as a security threat, particularly in a context when the country was transitioning to a democratic regime. Another reason for resisting cooperation was the potential reduction in the inflow of remittances, which is an integral part of the country's GDP (Adam et. al., 2020). Moutheen (2019) also argues that origin countries may be less inclined to cooperate based on political implications, including political scrutiny and its impact on their relationship with diasporic communities. As scholars have demonstrated, diasporic and emigrant groups have gradually played an important role in the country's national political affairs and in the economies of their hometowns (Adida and Girod 2011). Scholars also highlight that origin countries may oppose cooperation with host countries as a form of neo-colonial resistance, to reject imperial legacies (McNeill 2023; Cham and Adam 2023), assert their political sovereignty and as a response to highlight the inequalities that prevail in international migration governance – favoring the interests of host countries in the global north (Ellerman 2008).

While the scholarship has made important contributions about why countries decide to resist or cooperate in readmission procedures, the Mexican case, in particular the archival data, serves as a starting point to further expand the scholarship on deportation studies by encouraging scholars to explore when, how and why origin countries may not only cooperate or resist to the demands put forth by host countries, but under specific circumstances, encourage and promote the deportation of their nationals. Furthermore, the literature has assumed that deportation policies are only designed based on the interests of host countries (Ellerman 2003) and that host countries

are the leading authors in designing deportation policies. However, the Mexican case complicates such assumptions as it was the Mexican government that laid out possible ideas and insisted the U.S government to control unauthorized border crossings and encouraged the removal of Mexicans through a combination of informal and formal agreements. Through the Mexican case, this paper seeks to motivate scholars to explore further how origin countries use deportation as a strategy to negotiate and address their domestic (national and subnational) concerns and foreign policy agendas; and the conditions that permit origin countries to use proactiveness in deportation proceedings to their political and economic advantage.

Methods: Archival research across borders

As Délano Alonso (2018, 24) emphasizes, 'research that explores complex connections and interactions needs to be multi-sited.' Since deportation is a cross-border administrative process between host countries and origin countries, it requires the 'removal of national blinders' (Fitzgerald 2006). Therefore, I conducted archival research in the U.S and Mexico. More specifically, I conducted archival research at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and at Mexico's Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) in Mexico City in 2022. I selected the National Archives as it holds one of the largest collections from the Immigration Naturalization Services (INS) and the U.S Border Patrol, the two agencies responsible for managing immigration enforcement and deportation operations across the country's interior and along the U.S-Mexico border. On the Mexican side, I selected the AGN as it holds collections of letters, reports, and newspaper articles about policies and activities implemented under Mexican Presidential administrations. The goal of conducting archival research across borders was to trace the

conditions that triggered deportations in the U.S and how the Mexican government managed inflows of deportations.

In total, I examined over six hundred pieces of archival data, including government-issued documents such as diplomatic correspondence between Mexican and U.S government officials, formal and informal negotiation agreements, U.S Congressional transcripts, memos between U.S and Mexican immigration officials, reports from the U.S Border Patrol and the National Immigration Service (INS) and images of deportation operations. The purpose of examining these pieces of data was to develop a sequence of events and 'thick descriptions' (Geertz 1973) about when and how deportations took place and identify which actors and institutions in the U.S and Mexico were involved in designing deportation policies and carrying out deportations.

Based on analyzing documents that discussed processes of deportations from the U.S to Mexico, I was able to draw important observations, including (1) Mexico and the U.S government adopted a combination of formal and informal agreements on how to deport Mexicans, (2) Mexico encouraged deportation based on domestic concerns (3) Mexico's actions went beyond traditional practices of inter-state cooperation related to readmission procedures. Examining declassified government-issued documents allowed me to trace where and how negotiation processes unfolded and where decisions took place (Hazareesingh and Nabulsi 2008, 151) and unpack the black boxes, in this case, the mechanisms influencing Mexico's interests in becoming a proactive actor. Moreover, I also analyzed newspaper clippings and letters from deportees to

understand the consequences of Mexico's actions and how the public and press across the U.S and Mexico responded to deportation operations carried out throughout the 1940s and 1960s.

Using archival data to unpack Mexico's responses for managing deportations from the U.S. provided access to valuable data for drawing inferences about Mexico's role in shaping the deportation efforts of the U.S and how and why Mexico was proactive in facilitating deportations. Through the archives, I could access information that challenged assumptions about Mexico's role in deportation processes with the U.S. For example, through tracing Mexico's informal agreements on deportation, such as letters, memos, and telegrams, it was evident that Mexico's actions were not only shaped by the U.S.'s interests but also by the country's domestic concerns and that Mexico was able to economically and politically profit from its actions. Furthermore, I also came across information that Mexico's methods for facilitating deportation were intentionally designed to cause notions of displacement among deportees to deter them from re-emigration to the U.S. The following sections discuss under what contexts the Mexican government became a proactive actor in facilitating the deportation of its citizens.

The Context: The Bracero Program (1942 to 1964) and managing cross-border mobility

In the U.S, World War II created a demand for labor in agriculture and other industries. To address labor shortages, in 1942, the U.S and Mexican governments signed a labor agreement allowing Mexican workers to enter the U.S on short-term contracts. The agreements were intended to serve as a temporary wartime measure but were renewed until 1964 and these

agreements became known as the Bracero Program. Between 1942 to 1964, roughly 4.6 million[4] Mexicans entered the U.S with temporary visas to work predominately in the agricultural industry. Although the Mexican government was hesitant about entering into formal agreements with the U.S, it eventually viewed these agreements as a political and economic opportunity. Politically, the Bracero Program would permit the Mexican government to manage the flow of unauthorized labor emigration to the U.S, which the government had attempted but failed to accomplish since the early 20th century (Lytle Hernandez 2009; Fitzgerald 2006) to control the loss of a cheap labor force. As Délano (2011, 83) explains, the Bracero Program was 'expectational' as it allowed both governments to establish 'common rules to administrate the hiring of Mexican workers through bilateral mechanisms.' Regarding economics, the Bracero Program would ease the domestic pressures of unemployment, particularly in rural parts of the country, and serve as an opportunity to modernize Mexico through the skills and remittances that braceros[4] brought back (Craig 1971; Cohen 2001). Hence, for the Mexican government, the Bracero Program served as an opportunity to access materialistic gains through the remittances that braceros sent to their households and intangible gains by positioning itself as an ally of the U.S government by providing the nation with a cheap labor force during World War II.

During the early phase of the Bracero Program, Mexico had substantial leverage in the early stages of the negotiation process. However, from 1948 to 1951 the Bracero Program was decentralized. After WWII, Congress passed Public Law 40, officially terminating the Bracero Program. The Mexican government requested an extension because it was concerned about the

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[4] Estimate calculated from the 'Termination of the Bracero Program: Some Effects on Farm Labor and Migrant Housing Needs (1965), *U.S Department of Agriculture: Economic Research Service.* file:///Users/guadalupechavez/Downloads/799766%20(4).pdf

potential implications of the mass return of braceros and growing unemployment rates in central-western parts of Mexico. Although agreements between the U.S and Mexican governments regarding the importation of laborers continued, the U.S Congress did not endorse or provide oversight (Calavita 1992, 29) which meant that the U.S government was no longer the employer of braceros. Instead, growers and their representatives contracted workers directly from recruitment centers in Mexico. Growers were responsible for hiring and transporting Mexican laborers – pushing them to demand recruitment centers be relocated closer to the border to avoid having to pay additional transportation costs. However, the Mexican government was against moving recruitment centers close to the border as it would increase unauthorized emigration to the U.S and threaten the country's agricultural labor force in northern Mexico.

Throughout the post-war period, the U.S government and growers adopted a series of unilateral actions that went against the Mexican government's interests. Mexico's loss of power in the negotiation process was most evident during the 'El Paso' incident in October 1948, when the INS opened the border to Mexican workers for growers to hire on the spot. Roughly 7,000 to 8,000 men crossed the border under the surveillance of the INS from Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua to El Paso, Texas. To address the flow of unauthorized migration, in 1949, in agreement with Mexican negotiators, the U.S government adopted what Calavita calls a 'de facto legalization program' – a provision that became informally known as 'drying out the wetback'[5] where the U.S government legalized undocumented Mexican workers who were already in the U.S. and were given preference for new contracts over newly imported braceros (Calavita 1992, 29). However, the provision was counterintuitive, as the flow of undocumented workers increased

and failed to protect the rights of workers (Délano 2011, 93). From 1942 to 1952, roughly 2 million unauthorized Mexican migrants were apprehended by the INS.[6]

With the U.S entering the Korean War (1950 to 1953), the Mexican government had a slight advantage in renegotiating agreements to continue the Bracero Program. The U.S.'s dependency on a cheap labor force and importation of raw resources from Mexico for military production gave Mexican President Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946 to 1952) some leverage in requesting the U.S government to become the official employer of braceros. In 1951, the U.S Congress passed Public Law (PL) 78, which 'set the official parameters of the program' (Calavita 1992, 46) until the termination of the Bracero Program in 1964. Under PL 78, the U.S government become the employer of braceros. The U.S. government also agreed to have recruitment centers in the interior of Mexico, and contracting undocumented workers was not permitted. Following the implementation of PL 48 in 1951, curtailing flows of unauthorized migration became a key priority for the U.S government. The context of the Cold War and McCarthyism further intensified views against foreigners and justified a call to further control and secure the U.S.-Mexico border.

The press played a significant role in fueling xenophobic attitudes towards Mexican migrants (Goodman 2020; Garcia 1980). Reports by the INS and the press framed the rise of migrant encounters at the U.S-Mexico border as a 'wetback crisis' and as an 'invasion.' More specifically, such reports blamed Mexicans for depressing wages in the southwest, framed them as carriers of disease, blamed them for deteriorating housing across the interior of the country, and as a national threat. However, U.S growers demanded access to a cheap and stable labor force. To

please the demands of growers, in January 1954, after failing to convince Mexico to reopen recruitment centers in northern Mexican states, the U.S government released a press release that the government would grant contracts to Mexicans that crossed the border.

At the same time, however, to address the xenophobic attitudes of the public and concerns about the rise of undocumented Mexican migration, in June 1954, the U.S government launched Operation Wetback, an immigration enforcement operation to stem the flow of unauthorized (Mexican) migration through carrying out mass deportations. To reach its objective, the INS, in collaboration with state and local officials, launched a series of deportation drives along the U.S-Mexico border and across cities including Los Angeles, San Francisco, Kansas City, and Chicago. According to a report from the INS, nearly 1 million apprehensions were made in 1954.[7] Although Operation Wetback lasted for a year, the operation did reduce the number of apprehensions along the U.S-Mexico border. However, as historian Kelly Lytle-Hernandez (2010; 171) describes it, 'Operation Wetback was a larger than the usual deployment of the Border Patrol's familiar and failing tactics of migration control.' The amount of publicity that Operation Wetback received in the press triggered conditions of fear and uncertainty among Mexican communities, leaving many with limited options – including returning to their country of birth. Roughly 23,000 Mexicans were formally deported and 1 million left the U.S under 'voluntary departures'[5] in 1954. However, deportation operations continued throughout the 1950s.

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[5] Estimates were retrieved from the 'Annual report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C., Fiscal Year 1954'. See https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=nnc1.cu08541337&seq=8. According to the U.S Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), voluntary departures allow noncitizens to leave the U.S at their own expenses within a specific period to avoid undergoing formal deportation order and its consequences including but not limited to lifetime bars from re-entering the U.S. Voluntary departures are granted by an immigration judge or officers for the U.S Department of Homeland Security and are usually granted after an immigration agent apprehends a noncitizen. However,

While the Mexican government intended to use the Bracero Program to control flows of unauthorized emigration, the program triggered an influx of unauthorized migration to the U.S. In the early years of the program, the Mexican government adopted measures to curtail the flow of unauthorized migration, such as increasing surveillance at its northern border, but realized such measures were not enough to prevent its citizens from leaving, especially with the U.S.'s unilateral actions. The Mexican government attempted to pressure the U.S government, but rather than only concentrating on militarizing its border, the Bracero Program offered the Mexican government the opportunity to manage the mobility of its citizens through crafting strategies in dialogue with the INS and the U.S Border Patrol on how to deport unauthorized Mexican workers. Mexico's role in crafting deportation policies gained more relevance in U.S-Mexico relations throughout the 1950s when U.S immigration authorities framed the rise of Mexican apprehensions at the border as an 'invasion.'

Proactiveness in practice: Mexico's involvement in shaping deportation efforts from the U.S

Enforcing its northern border

On December 11, 1943, one year after the formal implementation of the Bracero Program, the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C, sent a letter to the U.S Department of State stating that Mexico was experiencing a series of economic losses as a result of the 'surreptitious departure' of its [agricultural] workers. In the letter, the Mexican government, stated that they had increased vigilance at its northern border but that the country needed 'active collaboration' from the U.S

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historian Adam Goodman (2020) argues that 'voluntary departures' is a government strategy to coerce noncitizens to leave the country. According to Goodman, the U.S has relied on voluntary departures as a cheaper mechanism to expedite the removal of noncitizens. See, *The Deportation Machine America's Long History of Expelling Immigrants.*

government.[6] The Mexican government also stated that 'the illegal border crossings under reference must be a matter of concern for the two governments.' Mexico was requesting the U.S government to secure its borders, otherwise it would see itself having to revise the joint labor agreements. One week later, Chief J.F McGurk assistant to Earl G. Harrison the Commissioner of INS explained to Harrison that the INS, needed to address Mexico's demands of extending its 'vigilance at the border to prevent clandestine and illegal entry of Mexican workers into the U.S.'[7] Such exchange made it evident that during the earlier stages of the Bracero Program, the U.S had higher levels of vulnerability. On the one hand, the country needed access to cheap labor to address the labor shortages and knew that they needed Mexico's assistance in managing cross-border migration flows.

The Mexican government adopted measures to enforce its northern border to address the economic and political implications of a mass [unauthorized] exodus. The Mexican government used different state actors, from commissioning military personnel and law enforcement officials from border states to police the border.[8] During the early years of the Bracero Program, the U.S Border Patrol dropped off deportees at the Mexican border, making it easy for deportees to cross back to the U.S. To address this concern, in 1945, President Ávila Camacho (1940 to 1946) requested the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) to disburse the amount of 20,600 (MXN) to transport deportees from the northern state of Sonora to the central state of Jalisco via

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[6] Letter from Mexican Embassy Washington, D.C, December 11, 1943, file: 56161/109, Box 19133, Research Group 89, NARA.

[7] Response from J.F. McGurk, Assist Chief to Earl G. Harrison, Commissioner, INS, Department of Justice, Philadelphia, PA, December 22, 1943, file: 56161/109, Box 19133, Research Group 89, NARA.

[8] Response letter from President Manuel Ávila Camacho to the Ministry of National Defense, February 1944, Mexico City, (AGN), Mexico, File Manuel Ávila Camacho 56161/109, Box, 793.

trains.[9] 1945 marked the year the Mexican government adopted measures to transport Mexicans

from the border into the interior of the country against their will and at the government's

expense. The purpose of these early modes of transportation from the border into the interior of

Mexico was to punish and deter deportees from re-emigrating to the U.S.

Figure 1. Map of routes to transport Mexicans into the interior of the country via trainlifts,
boatlifts and airlifts. [Map elaborated by author.]

The Mexican boatlifts from 1954 to 1956

Apart from the trainlifts, between 1954 to 1956, the U.S government used vessels to transport

Mexican deportees from Port Isabel, Texas, to Veracruz, Mexico. The vessels used to transport

Mexican deportees were owned by Mexican transportation companies, including the Transportes

Marítimos Refrigerados S.A (TMR) and the Transportes Marítimos y Fluviales (TMF). The U.S

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[9] Memo from Mexican President Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940 to 1946) to the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) requesting disbursement of 20,600 (MXN) to rail companies to transport Mexican deportees, February 1945, Mexico City, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN). File Manuel Ávila Camacho 56161/109, Box, 793.

government signed a series of contracts with the TMR and the TMF because these companies offered the cheapest option for removing Mexicans from U.S territory. The cost of renting a vessel for each voyage ranged from 72,000 to 90,000 Mexican pesos, and the price for transporting a deportee was 8 U.S dollars.[10] Roughly 800 deportees were transported in each voyage, including men, women, and children.[11] The first vessel departed port Isabel on September 3, 1954.[12]

Although the Mexican government was not involved in negotiating transportation contracts with the U.S government, nor did they directly profit from the contracts, based on informal agreements with officials from the INS including letters and copies of contracts, the Mexican government was responsible for inspecting the vessels and approving the use of vessels – necessary steps for carrying out deportations from the U.S. Furthermore, the Mexican government was also responsible for creating an infrastructure at the port of Veracruz for processing Mexican deportees and for transporting them into the interior of the country. The process for carrying out deportations via boatlifts required close engagement between U.S and Mexican authorities. A few days before the scheduled date of the deportation, Mexican and U.S officials, including staff from the Consulate of Brownsville, Texas, officials from the Secretariat of the Interior (SEGOB), and officials from the INS were in charge of inspecting the vessels and sharing a list of the deportees that would go onboard.[13] On the day of the deportation, women and children were placed in the same deck, while the men were separated. Each voyage lasted

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[10] Telegram, from TMR to INS sharing the cost of each passenger. November 10, 1955, file 56364/043.36, box 21936, Research Group 85, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. (NARA)

[11] More than fifty U.S Border Patrol reports mention that 800 deportees were inside the vessels. See file 56364/043.36, box 21936, Research Group 85 (NARA)

[12] Congressional report on the vessels that the U.S government used to deport Mexican noncitizens presented by William P. Rogers, U.S Deputy Attorney General, August 23, 1956, file 56364/043.36, box 21936, Research Group 85, (NARA)

[13] Ibid.,

approximately forty to sixty hours[14] Once the vessel arrived at the port of Veracruz, Mexican immigration officials escorted deportees to provisional warehouses where they remained under the custody of the SEGOB and Mexico's immigration officials. Individuals who were deported for the first time were released or were transported to Mexico City via trains or buses. According to reports from Border Patrol officers, 'repeaters' or those who had been deported more than once were handled separately and transferred to the Allende prison in Veracruz, where they were given a 15-day jail sentence as a form of punishment to deter them from re-emigrating to the U.S

Figure 2. Mexican deportees loading onto the *Mercucio*, August, 8, 1956, file: 56364/043.36 , Research Group 83, Box 21936, National Archives, Washington, DC

[14] Ibid.,

Not much was known about the experiences that the roughly 49,000 deportees encountered during the deportation boatlifts. However, an incident inside one of the vessels in 1956 generated media coverage, revealing the conditions deportees were exposed to. On August 28, 1956, the *Mercurio* one of the vessels owned by the Mexican contract company TMR, had to make an emergency stop at the Port of Tampico in the northern Mexican state of Tamaulipas. While the *Mercurio* was in the middle of the Pánuco River awaiting to cast anchor, over 500 of the deportees 'staged a riot' inside the vessel.[15] According to reports, thirty-six passengers jumped, five drowned and only three bodies were recovered.[16] The *Mercurio* incident led to U.S and Mexican media coverage and independent investigations by Mexican and U.S authorities.

Details about the precarious conditions deportees encountered led to public outrage by Mexico's opposition, local governments, and religious organizations. Media reports revealed that the *Mercurio* was designed to carry cargo and was not equipped for passengers.[17] The *Mercurio* lacked proper facilities to transport passengers safely, details that the Mexican government was aware of during their inspection routines but ignored. For example, the vessel lacked sufficient lifejackets for the 800 passengers on board and lacked sleeping facilities.[18] In the U.S, after requesting a Congressional inquiry, U.S Representative Robert H. Mollohan from the state of West Virginia described the *Mercurio* as a 'hell ship' with 'deplorable conditions.'[19] In interviews, deportees stated that some jumped off the vessel because they were from northern

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[15] Ibid.,

[16] Telegram from Mexico City to the U.S Department of State stating three bodies were recovered. August 29, 1956, file 56364/043.36, box 21936, Research Group 85, (NARA)

[17] Telegram from TMR to INS listing details and prices for renting the vessel. In the telegram, representatives from TMR state that the vessel transports cargo including bananas from Veracruz to the U.S, November 17, 1955, file 56364/043.36, box 21936, Research Group 85, (NARA)

[18] Newspaper clipping, 'Rep. Mollohan Orders Probe of 'Hell Ship,' Washington News, August 28, 1956, file 56364/043.36, box 21936, Research Group 85, (NARA)

[19] Ibid.,

Mexico and did not want to be transported south to Veracruz as this would require additional funds to return to their hometowns; funds that the Mexican government was unwilling to offer to deportees.[20] High-ranking Mexican federal authorities from the SEGOB and the SRE blamed the deportees and framed them as criminals, stating that the incident was politically inspired 'aimed at embarrassing' Mexico's presidential administration.[21] However, based on letters written by deportees and interviews with the press, most of these deportees were individuals caught attempting to cross the border or that had lived for extended periods in the U.S. On September 7, 1956, the SRE suspended all boatlifts from Texas to Veracruz. Although the Mexican government was forced to cancel all boatlifts out of the public scrutiny they received in the U.S and Mexican press, the government continued to proactively facilitate the deportation of its citizens through measures less visible to the public.

The Mexican Airlifts

Following the incident of the *Mercurio*, the Mexican government adopted different measures for facilitating the deportation of unauthorized Mexicans into the interior of the country, this time through airlifts. On November 10, 1957, an airplane departed from the Mexican northern border town of Reynosa, Tamaulipas, to the Mexican city of León, located in the central state of Guanajuato.[22] According to INS reports, about sixty passengers were onboard the airplane. Deporting Mexicans from the U.S to León required coordination between U.S immigration

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[20] Ibid.,

[21] Newspaper clipping, 'Barco, Contracto, Maltrato, Hambre: Todo Es Nusestro! La Historia Patriotera Tira Piedras Sobre Nuestro Propio Tejado Indefenso' Zocalo, August 27, 1956, file 56364/043.36, box 21936, Research Group 85, (NARA)

[22] Copy of agreement between the U.S and Mexico regarding airlifts from Reynosa to Leon. The report provides details about the Mexican actors and institutions involved in overseeing the flights, the dates the flights took place and how Mexican deportees were to be processed once they entered Mexican territory (in Reynosa, January 14, 1960, file: 56364/043NW to 56364/043 box 13, Research Group 85, (NARA)

officials and local authorities in Mexico. In the U.S, deportees were transported from detention camps to Hildalgo, Texas. Once deportees were in Hidalgo, they were driven by U.S Border Patrol officers or were forced to cross (by foot) the Reynosa-Hidalgo International Bridge. On the Mexican side, deportees were processed by Mexican immigration officials and transported to board planes to the Mexican city of León in the state of Guanajuato.[23] The logic behind transporting Mexicans against their will from Mexico's northern border into the interior of the country was the same as the boatlifts, to punish and deter deportees from re-entering the U.S. According to a report by an INS attaché in Mexico City, once deportees arrived in Leon, deportees were transported to railroad stations and were only provided transportation to locations south of León,[24] leaving those from northern Mexico stranded with limited financial resources.

It is important to note, however, that airlifts were not a new method for transporting Mexican deportees. According to historian Adam Goodman (2020), the first airlift occurred in 1946, but these airlifts only transported deportees within U.S territory from Arizona to Texas to then be deported by foot or bus to the Mexican side of the border. In 1951, the U.S government used private cargo airlines to transport Mexican deportees to various Mexican cities including, Durango, San Luis Potosi, and Guadalajara, but these airlifts were stopped in 1952 after INS failed to secure funding from Congress.[25] However, what made the airlifts from 1957 to the late 1960s different than previous years was the level of engagement from the Mexican government

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[23] Summary of call between Charles and Gustavo Diaz Ordaz regarding procedures to carry out airlifts. November 6, 1957, file 56364/043NW to 56364/043, box 13 Research Group 85, (NARA)
[24] Ibid.,
[25] Annual report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, June 30, 1952, *Department of Justice.* See section Border patrol, page 41, 'Airlifts.' https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015004046655&seq=59

in leading these deportation efforts. The Mexican government contracted Mexican airlines to transport Mexicans to León.

Furthermore, the Mexican government funded all the airlifts to transport deportees into the interior of the country. The Mexican government used its national airline Líneas Aéreas Unidas S.A (LAUSA) to transport Mexicans from Reynosa to León.[26] The Mexican government in dialogue with U.S government officials agreed to use its national airlines and airlifts as they considered it a faster method for transporting deportees into the interior of the country. During the negotiation process of implementing airlifts to Mexico, the INS wanted Mexico City to be the final destination for deportees. However, the Mexican government was hesitant as Mexican officials described Mexico City as the 'hub of the Mexican press.' The Mexican government was concerned that airlifts to Mexico City and the conditions under which deportees were being transported were going to generate more scrutiny from the press. Moreover, the Mexican government was preparing for the presidential elections of 1958 and wanted to avoid criticism that could jeopardize the image of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the country's political ruling party.[27] Therefore, the Mexican government selected León based on the support they received from municipal and state officials. Municipal and state officials considered deportation flights as an opportunity to gain profit and generate employment in the city. The mayor of León, for example, stated that the 'airlifts did not cause usual problems to the city' and that he was 'grateful for the small amount of business' the airlifts were bringing to his city. [28]

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[26] Report issued to all Border Patrol Inspectors, Southwest Region describing personnel and airline in charge of transporting Mexico to Leon via airlifts. November 5, 1957, file 56364/043NW to 56364/043, box 13, Research Group 85, (NARA)

[27] Ibid.,

[28] Report from INS commissioner summarizing the responses from state officials from Leon, Guanajuato regarding airlifts. January 30, 1958, file 56364/043NW to 56364/043, box 13, Research Group 85, (NARA)

Unpacking Mexico's interests

While Mexican government officials were weary of entering the Bracero Program, the Program also represented an opportunity that would permit the Mexican government to manage unauthorized labor emigration not only through implementing emigration enforcement measures as it did in the early 20th century but also through managing the deportation of its citizens with assistance from the U.S government. Part of Mexico's involvement in the Bracero negotiations was to address how it was going to assist the U.S government in deporting unauthorized Mexicans (in U.S territory). The U.S government demanded that the Mexican government cooperate in deportations by accepting deportees dropped off by immigration officials on the Mexican side of the border. As Lytle-Hernandez (2006, 423) highlights, 'by the 1940s Mexico had several decades of experience designing initiatives to control emigration'. However, as I have showcased, the Mexican government went beyond the U.S.'s demands and became proactive in facilitating the deportation of its citizens. The Mexican government became proactive by designing punitive measures centered on transporting deportees in inhumane conditions, displacing them into the interior of the country and away from their places of birth, as well as imprisoning repeaters, but why? What were Mexico's motives and interests behind these counterintuitive actions?

After President Lazaro Cárdenas (1936 to 1940) left office, Mexico went from supporting agrarian reform to prioritizing policies centered on expanding large-scale industrialization (King 1970) including the industrialization of agriculture. To industrialize agriculture, President Miguel Alemán Valdés (1940 to 1946) invested in irrigation systems, dam schemes, roads, and

agricultural research projects as part of the Green Revolution to enhance agricultural productivity (Henderson 2010). However, these public investments concentrated in northern Mexico, a region where profitable crops, such as cotton had a history of thriving since the late 19th century and was deeply tied to the political economy of the country (Walsh 2000). Between 1941 and 1952, over ninety percent of Mexico's agricultural budget went to irrigation projects in northern states (Henderson 2010, 60). Furthermore, these public investments disproportionally benefited commercially oriented private farmers (King 1970, 33), and only scarce support was allocated to *ejidatarios* or members of communal agricultural land. Given the importance of commercially oriented private farmers, the Mexican government grew dependent on their production, and such groups gradually gained more leverage in Mexican politics.

With the conditions set in place, including the infrastructure and political base to increase the exportation of products, mainly cotton, private farmers needed a cheap and flexible labor force. Following the implementation of the Bracero Program, a series of interest groups, from agribusinesses to industrial associations, began putting pressure on President Alemán Valdés to deter the flow of unauthorized labor migration. Interest groups described the exodus as a 'strain on agricultural production'[29] and stated that the lack of workers was rotting away cotton harvest.[30] To address the grievances of interest groups, the Mexican government not only enforced its northern border by sending military and immigration officials as well as requesting assistance from the U.S government in surveilling its southern border to curtail emigration, but the Mexican government also became involved by designing strategies to deport its citizens

[29] Letter from Coronel Gabino Vizcarra the President of la Legion Mexicana to President Manuel Ávila Camacho, July 16, 1943, AGN, Mexico City.
[30] Letter from the National Chamber of the Transformation Industry to President Ávila Camacho, December 20, 1945, AGN, Mexico City.

away from the U.S-Mexico border. One of those strategies, as discussed, featured deporting deportees into the country's interior. The purpose of this deportation strategy was to punish and deter deportees from re-emigrating to the U.S, hoping to control the mobility of Mexican laborers.

The Mexican government also became proactive in facilitating the deportation of its citizens to cultivate further its diplomatic relationship with the U.S and the benefits that came from such a relationship, including securing the continuation of the Bracero Program and support in other topics such as commercial trade. Although the rise of unauthorized labor emigration was a problem for the Mexican government, such a topic was not significant for the U.S government at least during the early stages of the Bracero Program. As scholars have highlighted, the U.S government, throughout the Bracero Program, adopted a series of unilateral actions that went against the interests of Mexico, including opening its border and allowing the flow of unauthorized workers (Calavita 1996; Craig 1971). However, the topic of unauthorized (Mexican) migration became a concern for the U.S government during the mid-1950s when government officials visited the border out of pressure from the public and press, who framed unauthorized Mexicans as the key actors responsible for unemployment and for the social ills the region was experiencing.

The U.S government sought to address the so-called 'wetback invasion' by increasing the presence of the Border Patrol throughout its southern border and called for a massive 'round up of unauthorized migration' an immigration enforcement operation officially known as Operation Wetback. However, to make their immigration enforcement policies effective, the U.S

government needed Mexico's assistance. Before launching Operation Wetback, in 1952 the Department of Justice (DOJ), the agency responsible for overseeing immigration enforcement, requested funding from the House Appropriation Committee to construct a 150-mile fence along the border, but the request was rejected. The DOJ also requested funding to transport Mexican deportees into the interior of Mexico through U.S airlifts. However, such requests were also rejected[31] which meant that the INS did not have the means to transport Mexican deportees away from the U.S-Mexico border as they had intended. The Mexican government saw the INS's vulnerability in implementing its border and deportation efforts as an opportunity to assist the country despite the series of unilateral decisions the U.S made in earlier years. Mexico's proactiveness became most evident during the summer of 1954 when the INS launched Operation Wetback and in the aftermath of the [immigration enforcement] operation. Apart from accepting flows of deportees at the border, the Mexican government encouraged and facilitated deportations by leasing the U.S government with modes of transportation, including boats, airplanes, and buses, to move deportees from the border into the interior of the country. Designing such actions permitted the Mexican government to address the exodus of unauthorized labor migration based on demands from northern Mexican economic elites but also facilitate the continuation of the Bracero Program. Following Operation Wetback, the INS increased the number of Bracero contracts which was one of the key demands of the Mexican government. The number of braceros admitted rose from 309,033 in 1954 to 445,197 in 1956.

For the Mexican government, the continuation of the Bracero Program was crucial as it assisted the country in offsetting domestic concerns such as alleviating the country from unemployment,

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[31] Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for the Fiscal Year 1952. Department of Justice. See page 41 subsection 'The Airlifts.' https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015004046655&seq=59

which disproportionally concentrated in central-western and southern parts of the country. While

Mexico's large-scale industrialization policies stimulated development and increased production,

such levels were unequally distributed, particularly in the agricultural sector (Moreno-Bird and

Ros 2009, 103). Although crop production between 1940 and 1965 grew at a rate of 5.7% per

year (Moreno-Bird and Ros 2009,103), Mexico's agricultural investments disproportionally

benefited export-oriented private growers in northern Mexico but neglected agricultural

production in central-western Mexico, which was largely based on ejidos.[32] Those granted ejidos

had the right to cultivate and sell crops individually or collectively but could not sell the land.[33]

President Lazaro Cárdenas (1934 to 1940) is credited for implementing Mexico's most radical

land reform policies. More land was distributed in Mexico between 1935 and 1940 as ejidos than

in previous Mexican presidential administrations (Levitsky and Way 2022, 147). During his time

in power, Cárdenas distributed roughly 50 million acres of land to 811,157 individuals (Dwyer

2008, 82). However, Cárdenas's presidential successors slowed down the distribution of land.

Out of fear that the ejido system would slow down agricultural investment, in 1940, the Mexican

government under newly elected President Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940 to 1946) adopted a

series of legal provisions designed to slow down land distribution to peasants. In 1940, the

administration provided more legal protections to private landowners from land expropriation,

and in 1942, the Mexican government reduced the number of hectares of land that could be

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[32] An ejido is a system of collective land that the Mexican government expropriated from wealthy landowners and distributed to local groups of peasants mainly for agricultural purposes.

[33] Although the concept of *ejidos* is rooted in pre-revolutionary indigenous community models, the *ejido* system established under Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution allowed the government to expropriate land from large landowners and distribute it to rural communities. Members of *ejidos*, or *ejidatarios*, were granted the right to use portions of the land mainly for agriculture, but they did not have the right to sell or lease the land. To request land in the form of an *ejido*, as Sellars (2019, 1217) describes, required 'citizen cooperation.' Individuals interested in requesting government-sponsored land had to file a petition as a group to their state governor describing why they needed land in their villages (Albertus et. al 2015). Once a petition was filed, it was up to state and federal officials to review the petitions and locate portions of land that could be expropriated to form *ejidos* (Sellars 2015).

expropriated (Albertus et al., 2016). Furthermore, unfavorable weather conditions and population growth left many individuals without access to land, motivating many to seek employment in the U.S through the Bracero Program. Hence, the Mexican federal government needed access to more bracero contracts to meet the demands of state and local officials and to prevent men from emigrating without authorization.

By assisting the U.S in effectively implementing its deportation efforts from the 1940s to the 1960s, the Mexican government was able to secure additional bracero contracts from the U.S government. Following Operation Wetback, the INS increased the number of Bracero contracts, an outcome intended not only to benefit Mexico but also the demands of U.S growers. The number of admitted braceros rose from 309,033 in 1954 to 445,197 in 1956.[34] while the number of border apprehensions and deportations decreased. Additional bracero contracts benefited Mexico by offsetting unemployment pressures and destabilizing collective action in areas with high unemployment rates (Sellars, 2015) while stimulating development via the remittances that braceros sent back to their households. As Cohen (2011, 24) documents, by the 1950s, bracero remittances ranked Mexico's third source of 'hard currency.'

Discussion and Conclusion

How do origin countries respond to the deportation efforts designed by host countries? Scholars have highlighted that for deportations to be carried out successfully, host countries depend on

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[34] Numbers retrieved from Table 1. 'Foreign workers admitted for temporary employment in U.S agriculture, by year and nationality' in report Termination of the Bracero Program: Some Effects on Farm Labor and Migrant Housing, U.S Department of Agriculture: Economic Research Service, 1965.

inter-state cooperation from origin countries (Ellerman 2008; Cassarino 2007). Host countries have adopted strategies, such as bilateral agreements, threats, and concession schemes to secure inter-state cooperation in readmission processes. However, origin countries are not passive actors that will always give in to the demands of host countries.

The Mexican case during the 1940s and the 1960s showcases that some origin countries may not only decide to cooperate in deportation efforts by adhering to readmission procedures or by simply giving in to the threats and demands put forth by host countries but also become proactive actors in facilitating the deportation of their citizens. This proactiveness entails encouraging, promoting, and expediating deportation processes through designing [in dialogue] with host countries procedures how to carry out deportations. Despite the economic and political backlash, Mexico's actions imply that some origin countries are more willing to become proactive actors when the stakes are high, that is when they can use such proactiveness to their advantage for addressing their domestic concerns and/or bilateral agendas. However, this study indicates that the contexts that could permit some origin countries to enter into dialogue and design policies with host countries on how to carry out deportations to their advantage is more likely to take place in moments when host countries need assistance from origin countries in implementing border and deportation policies for removing unwanted citizens.

This paper has important implications and opens new questions for expanding the scholarship on the politics of Mexico-U.S migration and deportation studies. First, through introducing the concept of proactiveness, the paper indicates that origin countries are not passive actors in the deportation policies adopted by host countries but rather origin countries under specific

circumstances, encourage and promote the deportation of their citizens for political gains. Second, through exploring how and why the Mexican government became a proactive actor in facilitating the deportation of its citizens from the 1940s to the 1960s, this paper seeks to expand research on how the Mexican government has managed deportation flows from the U.S. and how and why such policy responses have changed or not. Has the Mexican government been proactive in facilitating deportations over the last decade? Why or why not? Furthermore, while existing literature has discussed the challenges that deportees experience in the aftermath of deportation (Anderson and Solis 2014; Caldwell 2019) we still lack insights on how the responses of origin countries or lack thereof contribute to conditions of precarity in the post-deportation context. There is a need for more scholarship that traces the type of policies origin countries such as Mexico have adopted to manage deportations and what factors shape their policy preferences.

While studies on deportation continue to use the experiences of deportees as starting points for theorizing about the logics of deportation (Anderson and Solis 2014; Coutin 2016) and its implications (Kanstroom 2012; Golash Boza 2015), more research is needed that disaggregates how origin countries shape the deportation policies of host countries. Addressing the former and latter requires engaging in new methodologies including exploring state archives – spaces that hold paper trails about processes, actions, and interactions hidden from the public. Nevertheless, many challenges come with conducting archival research in state archives, particularly on topics such as deportation, which for countries with extended inflows of deportation is a subject of discomfort. Engaging in state archival collections requires navigating secrecy, lack of transparency, and missing files. Yet, as Bosma, de Goede, and Pallister-Wikins (2020) write, 'closed doors' do not constitute failed research.' Instead, secrecy and lack of transparency, should

push researchers to adopt new strategies such as rethinking the places where to consult archival

materials, including spaces of resistance such as community and grassroots archives.

Finally, as deportations continue to be a salient mechanism for managing unwanted flows of

migration across the global north and the global south, we need more comparative research that

theorizes the conditions that motivate origin countries in facilitating deportation efforts and to

what extent do such conditions and motivations vary not only from deportation flows from the

global north to global south but also south-to-south deportation flows. In sum, this paper seeks to

continue challenging assumptions that origin countries are passive actors because of

asymmetrical dynamics. Instead, the paper pushes scholars to unpack further when and how

origin countries use migration as a key topic for navigating asymmetrical power relations and

accessing resources to address or advance local, national, and foreign policy priorities.

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Appendix

Achieves Consulted

Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Mexico City, Mexico

- o Fondo Manuel Avila Camacho, file 546.6/120, box, 793

National Archives and Records Administration, (NARA) Washington, D.C

- o File 659.4, research group 85, box 21916
- o File UD-05W8, research group, box 13
- o File 56161/109, research group, box 19133
- o File 56364/043.36Pt.1 to 56364/043.36 Pt 1. research group 85, box 21936

Online reports from the Immigration and Naturalization Service

Annual Reports

- o Annual report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1954 *U.S. Department of Justice*, Washington D.C.: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=nnc1.cu08541337&seq=8
- o Annual report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1952, *U.S. Department of Justice*. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015004046655&seq=59